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ABSTRACT

The history of government regulatory policy in the United States generally goes back to the beginning of the Progressive Era at the end of the 19th century. Since then, government regulatory activity has expanded in scope and nature, generally in the sense of a greater regulatory presence of the government in society. Nevertheless, there have been phases in which countervailing deregulatory sentiment has prevailed. Given the ever-proliferating number of federal agencies and the increasing impact their rules and laws have on society, understanding government regulatory history as a way of anticipating future developments is of major importance, especially given the present political landscape in Washington. This article will adopt a historical narrative methodology to examine U.S. government regulatory policy, using a chronological structure and an interpretive approach in offering explanations for the various phases in the regulatory process. Causality and context will be attempted considering key economic, social, political, and cultural factors. Periods of significant regulatory activity will be examined, including the Progressive Era, Wilson's New Freedom program, Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, and the era of deregulation and social regulation in the 1970s. The article will also discuss shifts in legislative authority over regulatory policy between Congress and the Executive branch.

La storia della politica di regolamentazione governativa negli Stati Uniti risale generalmente all'inizio dell'era progressista alla fine del XIX secolo. Da allora, l'attività di regolamentazione governativa si è ampliata in termini di portata e natura, generalmente nel senso di una maggiore presenza normativa del governo nella società. Ciononostante, ci sono state fasi in cui ha prevalso un sentimento di deregolamentazione compensativo. Dato il numero sempre crescente di agenzie federali e il crescente impatto che le loro regole e leggi hanno sulla società, comprendere la storia della regolamentazione governativa come un modo per anticipare gli sviluppi futuri è di grande importanza, soprattutto dato l'attuale panorama politico a Washington. Questo articolo adotterà una metodologia narrativa storica per esaminare la politica normativa del governo degli Stati Uniti, utilizzando una struttura cronologica e un approccio interpretativo nell'offrire spiegazioni per le varie fasi del processo normativo. Si cercherà di considerare la causalità e il contesto considerando i fattori economici, sociali, politici e culturali chiave. Verranno esaminati i periodi di significativa attività normativa, tra cui l'era progressista, il programma New Freedom di Wilson, il New Deal di Franklin D. Roosevelt e l'era della deregolamentazione e della regolamentazione sociale negli anni '70.

L'articolo discuterà anche i cambiamenti nell'autorità legislativa sulla politica di regolamentazione tra il Congresso e il ramo esecutivo.

Keywords: Progress Era, the New Freedom, the New Deal, Industrial Revolution, Interstate Commerce Act, Sherman Antitrust Act, Federal Reserve Act, Federal Trade Commission, the Great Depression, the Great Stagflation, Oyez case, the Administrative Procedures Act, liberal consensus, oil price shock, counterculture, net benefits approach, dynamic conservatism, regulatory capture.

1 – Introduction

Significant governmental regulatory intervention in the economy and social welfare began at the end of the 19th century with the rise of the Progressive Movement, which emerged in response to dramatic economic and demographic changes. Throughout the following century, regulatory activity continued to expand in scope and nature, though not without opposition, which at times involved constitutional questions regarding who had the ultimate legislative authority (the Executive or Congressional branch) in this area and what types of regulatory activity would best serve the economic interests of the country.

This paper gives an overview of government regulation in the U.S. from the Progressive Era through the presidency of Ronald Reagan. The decision to use the Reagan presidency as a cutoff point can be justified as it represented a significant moment in the deregulatory phase during the 1970s, following a half century of regulatory momentum.

2 – The Rise of the Progressive Movement Under Theodore Roosevelt

Governmental regulatory bodies are often referred to as the “fourth branch of government”. The initial impetus to government intervention in the economy was the Industrial Revolution, which began toward the end of the 19th century and was characterized by rapid growth and a movement away from agriculture to manufacturing.

Industrialization and commercialization during the latter part of the 19th century had created large-size firms with great resources (Glaeser, 2003). Unfortunately, along with this came the inherent contradictions of rising capitalism: on the one hand, the formation of huge business enterprises (trusts) in “finance, real estate, steel, copper, coal, retail, oil, railroads, and other areas” (Rolnik, 2016) along with rising wages and overall economic prosperity, and on the other growing inequality, anti-competitive business practices, and safety and health concerns for workers.

In the 19th century, it was believed that redress from “social wrongs” could be obtained through the judicial system. However, in the thirty years from the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 (see below) and the end of the Progressive movement in 1917, social reformers became instrumental in ensuring that regulatory agencies at the state and federal level had taken over “the social control of competition, anti-trust policy, railroad pricing, food and drug safety”, among other things (Glaeser, 2003).

Many regulatory agencies in existence today in the U.S. were created during the Progressive Era, a period of significant political and social reform as a response to problems and inequities arising from the country's rapid industrialization and urbanization. The driving force behind the Progressive movement was the middle class which, at the end of the 19th century, was wary of both the increasingly larger corporations and the more radical political movements of

Midwestern and Western farmers and laborers that arose in opposition to the former. What the Progressives wanted was “to ensure competition and free enterprise [and to fight] corruption in the public sector” (U.S. Department of State, Outline of the U.S. Economy).

In 1887, Congress created the first regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), to contain railroad rates, and in 1890 it passed the country's first competition statute: the Sherman Antitrust Act (Rolnik, 2016). These initial regulatory actions came at a time when the Progressive Era was entering its most influential period, transitioning from a state-wide movement to a federally led one (Gopnik & O'Neil, 2025). Beginning in 1901, with the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, until the end of Woodrow Wilson's second term as President in 1920, these laws were applied rigorously (U.S. Department of State, Outline of the U.S. Economy).

By the time Roosevelt assumed the presidency in September of 1901 (following the assassination of William McKinley), the country's population had nearly doubled from 1870, and immigrants were pouring into cities to work in the rapidly growing number of factories. The rapid urbanization and industrialization of society produced “overcrowded cities, poor working conditions, great economic disparity, and the political dominance of big business” (Milkis). In this social context, the Progressive movement worked to further “social and political reform, [curb] political corruption caused by political machines, and [limit] the political influence of large corporations” (U.S. Department of State Archive).

Roosevelt sought to “ensure social justice and economic opportunity through government regulation”. Roosevelt was not a radical social reformer; rather, while working to mitigate the excesses and injustices of a growing capitalist society, he recognized the role of big business in a “maturing economy” and the need for compromise to achieve his social policies (Milkis).

Nevertheless, he put big business on notice when, in 1904, the Supreme Court agreed with him that the Northern Securities Company, a large railroad conglomerate, was in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and had to be dismantled. He then went on to further regulate the railroads through the Elkins Act, the Hepburn Act, and by strengthening the power of the ICC to regulate shipping rates. Roosevelt also used his office to mediate between mine workers and mine owners in Pennsylvania, gaining recognition as the first “conservationist president” by, among other things, “increasing the amount of protected land from 42 million acres to 172 million acres ... [and creating] five national parks, eighteen national monuments, and 51 wildlife refuges” (Milkis). Finally, in the area of working conditions and health, his Administration passed the Meat Inspection Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act (which also created the Food and Drug Administration) in 1906, representing the federal government's foray into regulating national consumer standards.

3 – Government Regulatory Policies From Woodrow Wilson to the Beginning of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Presidency

Elected President in 1913, Woodrow Wilson transformed the office into the dominant branch of the federal government (Ambar, Miller center, 2025). Wilson entered office intent on regulating an economy “increasingly dominated by large industrial and financial corporations” that he felt were stifling competition and damaging the interests of workers and consumers (Kazin, 2025).

Wilson advanced the Progressive movement's agenda through government economic regulation that included tariff reform with the Underwood Tariff Act of 1913, which reduced tariffs by 10%. The bill also contained a small, graduated income tax to compensate for part of

the lost revenue from the tariff reduction (the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 had removed any constitutional roadblock to an income tax) (Kazin, 2025).

The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 ushered in significant banking and monetary reform, creating a system “whose directors had the power to balance the interests of big and small financial institutions alike, as well as the exclusive right to issue money” (Kazin, 2025). Spurred by the belief that the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 had not done enough to combat the monopolistic tendencies in the economy, Congress passed the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914 (Gropnik), the latter establishing a new government agency, the Federal Trade Commission, which had the authority to enforce the Clayton Act and publish violations that hurt consumers.

Though Wilson stated in a public letter that his New Freedom reforms had been completed by 1914, re-election calculations and his movement toward a more Progressive stance led to a second wave of regulatory measures, beginning with the appointment of Louis D. Brandeis, a harsh critic of big business and finance, to the Supreme Court. This was soon followed by passage of a rural-credits bill to aid farmers, and anti-child-labor and federal workmen’s-compensation laws. In addition, the Adamson Act instituted an eight-hour working day for interstate railroad workers (Gopnik *et al.*, 2025).

During the 1920s, Congress created other agencies to regulate “interstate trade, water and power, communications, commodity exchanges, and other areas of activity” (Dudley, 2019). In 1920, Congress created the Water Power Commission (precursor to the Federal Power Commission); in 1922, the Commodities Exchange Authority; and in 1927, the Federal Radio Commission (1927), which subsequently became the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The majority of these agencies were created as independent regulatory commissions outside of executive departments—and therefore “independent of presidential control”—whose members “could only be dismissed for good cause”: inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. This approach was in line with the view generally held by the courts that the Constitution prohibited the delegation of powers by Congress to the executive branch (Dudley, 2015).

However, by the time FDR took office in 1932, the Supreme Court’s view in this regard had evolved, with the Court holding in a 1928 case that Congress could “within ‘defined limits’ ... vest discretion in Executive officers to make public regulations and direct the details of statutory execution” (Hampton, 2025). Given this legal backdrop, and the view that the economic crisis of the 1930s stemmed largely from the failure of competition—marked by the rise of trusts, pyramids, corporatism, and big business —and a federal government that had left regulatory control to state and local authorities, FDR’s New Deal embodied the idea that it was the government’s responsibility to restore public confidence (Rolnik, 2016).

4 – The New Deal and Governmental Regulatory Policy

Harvard economist Richard Vietor wrote that “the era of regulation [was] framed by the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Stagflation of the 1970s” (Vietor, 1996). In both cases, severe economic hardship was a driving force for significant government regulatory actions. In the case of the FDR Administration, there was the added impetus from the Second World War.

The FDR presidency (1933-1945) and the New Deal programs witnessed important changes in the nature and extent of the government’s role in the economy. As noted above, this period saw Congress continue to delegate legislative authority to the regulatory agencies, resulting in

an expansion in the authority and jurisdiction of these agencies in banking, agriculture, labor relations, and public welfare, and the appearance of “many of the most important laws and institutions that define America’s modern economy” (Moffatt, 2023).

The condition of workers was addressed by the establishment of minimum standards for wages and hours on the job, while labor unions gained more influence in, among others, the steel, automobile, and rubber industries. In addition, a number of agencies and programs fundamental to the functioning of a modern economy were created, such as the Security and Exchange Commission to regulate Wall St., the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to protect bank deposits, and the Social Security System (Moffatt, 2023).

Among the most important regulatory agencies created as part of the New Deal were the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (1931), the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (1932), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (1933), the Commodity Credit Corporation (1933), the Farm Credit Administration (1933), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (1934), and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (1935). There was also an expansion in the jurisdiction of other agencies, such as the ICC, the FCC, and the FDA. In addition, a new agency—the present-day Employment Standards Administration—was created in the Department of Labor under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Dudley, 2015).

5 – Regulatory Backlash

As outlined above, in the decades following the creation of the ICC in 1887, Congress created a number of agencies to regulate, among other things, interstate trade, communications, water and power, and commodity exchanges (Dudley, 2021). In many cases, these agencies operated outside the purview of the executive departments and therefore were not subject to presidential control. Up until the Supreme Court ruling in the *Oyez* case in 1928, the courts had prohibited Congress from delegating legislative authority to the administrative agencies—following a strict interpretation of the first three articles of the Constitution regulating the separation of powers among the three branches of government—in line with what was known as the “nondelegation doctrine” (Dudley, 2021). In *Oyez*, the Supreme Court interpreted this doctrine to mean that Congress could delegate legislative authority to the regulatory agencies as long as statutes contained an “intelligible principle” to guide executive action, ruling that “Congress could delegate discretion to other entities to “secure the exact effect” of legislation if it provides an “intelligible principle” to which the President or other entity must conform” (Cornell Law School).

Under FDR, the congressional delegation of legislative authority intensified, leading to a growing debate about the constitutionality of such a shift in the balance of power among the branches of government. Debate on this question would continue until 1946, when Congress passed the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) “to resolve the conflict between bureaucratic efficiency and the rule of law, [thus permitting] the continued growth of government regulation”, a role the APA still plays today (Dudley, 2015). Initially, opponents of the New Deal and the growing regulatory rules-making role it gave the executive branch turned to the courts for support. For example, in 1935 the Supreme Court invalidated two provisions of the National Recovery Act (1933), invoking the non-delegation principle, ruling that “Congress is not permitted by the Constitution to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is vested” and that “the delegation of legislative power sought to be made to the President [under the Act...] exceeds the power of Congress to regulate interstate

commerce and invades the power reserved exclusively to the States" (A.L.A., 1935). In response to these obstacles, FDR began to appoint more liberal judges to the Supreme Court and to the lower courts, thereby turning the "judicial tide" in his favor (Shepherd, 2016).

The APA represented a compromise between liberal New Dealers and conservative opponents of the program. Its provisions struck a balance between "promoting individuals' rights and maintaining agencies' policy-making flexibility", and it has stood the test of time until the present, with only minor modifications (Shepherd, 2016). President Harry S. Truman signed the Act into law in June 1946. In essence, it provided procedures agencies had to follow when promulgating rules and procedures in those areas delegated to it by Congressional statute. In addition, agencies had to publish all their rules and allow for public comment, with final rules subject to judicial review for compliance under the Act's provisions.

6 – The Postwar Regulatory Landscape: The Eisenhower Years

The regulatory landscape after the Second World War was largely conditioned by the economic context, with different phases occurring at times as a form of "corrective action". The cultural climate would also become an important factor beginning in the 1960s.

The New Deal had firmly established the fundamental role of government in providing for economic and social stability (U.S. Dept. of State, Outline of American History). The economic prosperity of the 1950s contributed to a broad consensus across party lines for business regulation (Vietor), providing a basic social safety net, creating infrastructure, and safeguarding civil rights. The idea was "to use tax dollars to create national wealth" (Richardson, 2025). The opposition to regulation and taxes that did exist was not able to overcome the wide support in both parties for the "liberal consensus".

While Republican President Dwight Eisenhower accepted the fundamental principle of government responsibility set forth in the New Deal, he tried to limit the presidential role in this regard, referring to his approach as "dynamic conservatism" or "modern Republicanism". Eisenhower explained this as meaning "conservative when it comes to money, liberal when it comes to human beings" (U.S. Dept. of State, Outline of American History). He rejected the "Old Guards" in the Republican party who discussed eliminating some of the New Deal programs and rolling back government economic regulation. He wanted to "[preserve] individual freedom and the market economy" while also ensuring that "government would provide necessary assistance to workers who had lost their jobs or to the ill or aged, who through no fault of their own, could not provide for themselves" (Pach, Jr.).

Among his achievements were the expansion of Social Security, with extended coverage to millions of additional persons and higher benefits for present and future beneficiaries, an increase in the minimum wage, the creation of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and government support for low-income housing. There were also major infrastructure projects under his Administration: collaborating with Canada in the building of the St. Lawrence Seaway and the Interstate Highway program (1956), which created a 41,000-mile road system (Pach, Jr.).

7 – The Postwar Regulatory Landscape: the 1970s and 1980s

The Postwar period until 1968 was characterized by a "prolonged period of prosperity [favoring a] broad consensus on regulatory policy". However, the period after 1968 and into the 1970s witnessed an economic slowdown characterized by three important developments: the oil price

shock in 1973, a ballooning trade deficit, and stagflation (Rolnik, 2016). While GDP had grown at an annual rate of 4.3% from 1938 to 1968, from 1968 to 1975 it rose by only 1.9% annually. Inflation rose from 3.8% in the former period to 6.8% in the latter. And if we extend the latter period to 1983, we find no noticeable change in economic performance (Vietor, 1966).

This economic context helps explain the general bipartisan deregulatory consensus in the '70s and '80s, which saw both Republicans and "consumer-oriented liberals" seeking to limit government interference in the free market through deregulation, thereby lowering prices and improving services. This bipartisan consensus brought together "traditional laissez-faire Republicans, on the one hand, and [...] Ralph Nader and the consumer Democrats on the other". Providing an academic underpinning to the deregulatory sentiment were economic studies that championed deregulation. Two studies stand out: the first by Nobel Laureate and University of Chicago professor George Stigler titled *The Theory of Economic Regulation*, in which the author speaks of "regulatory capture" when regulation is "taken over" by the industries and companies that are themselves the subject of regulatory policy in order to serve their own needs. The second was the 1970 work *The Economics of Regulation* by Alfred Kahn—known as the "father of airline deregulation"—of Cornell University (Rolnik, 2016).

Along with the economic rationale, there was also growing across-the-board antipathy towards the state and "anti-bureaucratic sentiment" (Schiller, 2019). The previous decade had been a turbulent period in the country, particularly from 1965 on, with the escalation of the Vietnam war and civil rights unrest. The Counterculture and the New Left movements—which were the descendants of the "Beat subcultures" of the 1950s—were alienated by the country's "technocratic society", and they responded by "developing alternative cultures that emphasized authenticity, individualism, and community" (Slonecker, 2017). Pervading the ideas of these movements was a deep-seated distrust of the state.

Important deregulatory actions occurred during the Carter Administration (1977-1980), especially regarding price controls. Carter's head of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), Alfred Kahn, pushed for complete deregulation to achieve a more competitive and consumer-oriented airline industry. The Airline Deregulation Act was signed into law in 1978, which led a few years later to the abolishment of the CAB. Carter also appointed Darius Gaskins, who worked under Kahn at the CAB, as chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). In his relatively brief period at the ICC, Gaskins was influential in a number of other deregulatory acts: the Motor Carrier Act (1980), which deregulated the trucking industry, the Staggers Rail Act, which brought competitive rail rates to the industry, and the Telecommunications Act, which removed restrictions on long-distance telephone service. All of these measures "allowed new entrants into the markets, increased efficiency, lowered prices, offered consumers more choices, and likely contributed to declining inflation". (Dudley, 2023). There was thus a dramatic change in the structure of markets: "new entrants flooded in, product and service markets were redefined, and prices fell. To survive, incumbent firms were forced to adopt entirely new strategies" (Vietor, 1996).

At the same time that economic deregulation was moving forward, the opposite trend was taking place regarding social regulations, spurred on by the growing influence of environmentalist and consumer protection movements, which sought to protect health, safety, and the environment. More than 20 major federal agencies came into being in the 1970s. Among these, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Mine Safety Agency and Health Administration, the National Transportation Safety

Board, the Council on Wage and Price Stability, and the Federal Election Commission (Kramer, 1979).

The bipartisan deregulation phase carried over from the Carter Administration to the Reagan presidency. Reagan was a free-market warrior, seeing the overregulation of the U.S. economy as the cause of the energy and stagflation crises, as evidenced by his famous quote: "In the present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem" (Decker, 2019).

Though the deregulatory wave slowed during the Reagan years (1981-1988), there were some important actions, including the easing or elimination of price controls in the energy sector and the deregulation of the wellhead prices of oil and natural gas, leading to the deregulation of the wholesale electricity market (Pierce). In addition, price controls were eased or eliminated on cable TV, long-distance telephone service, interstate bus service, and ocean shipping (Niskanen).

Regarding antitrust policy, the Reagan years saw a reduction in the scope of antitrust laws. The Administration sought to "refocus antitrust on purely economic concerns...[being] careful to ensure that [...] only conduct that is unambiguously anticompetitive and clearly illegal" was prosecuted, in particular, horizontal restrictions such as "price-fixing, bid rigging and market allocation among competitors" (Cheffins, 2022).

Finally, restrictions were reduced on the financial services industry; for example, the government allowed banks to invest in a broader range of assets and relaxed controls on bank interest rates. In addition, enforcement of the Clean Air Act was relaxed, and large areas of public land were opened up to oil drilling by the Department of the Interior, headed by its controversial secretary, James Watt (Kenton, 2024).

8 – Reporting and Compliance Burdens of Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and OIRA

The aforementioned wave of social regulations in the 1970s to protect health, safety, and the environment brought with it concerns regarding the reporting and compliance burdens of the new regulatory rules. These concerns contributed to the subsequent phase of regulatory reform, which focused not so much on deregulation per se but on ensuring that the benefits of regulatory reform outweighed its costs. Most of the changes in this regard came via presidential executive orders.

The Carter Administration issued Executive Order 12044 in 1978, requiring agencies to make publicly available their analyses of the impact of proposed regulations. Agencies were also required to ensure that "alternative approaches have been considered and the least burdensome of the acceptable alternatives has been chosen" and to look outside of traditional command and control regulation in considering regulatory alternatives (H.R.6410).

In 1980, the Paperwork Reduction Act created the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). OIRA was to review and approve all new reporting requirements, the overall objective being to "reduce paperwork and enhance the economy and efficiency of the Government and the private sector by improving Federal information policymaking, and for other purposes" (HR 6410). Since then, "benefit-cost balancing has since become standard practice in most regulatory agencies, and it is increasingly expected by reviewing courts" (Dudley, 2019).

President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291 on taking office in 1981. This arguably was his most important regulatory policy, under which “all agencies [were required] to apply cost-benefit analysis to every major rule and to issue the version of the rule that maximizes the net economic benefits of the rule”, to ensure that its benefits exceeded its costs (Pierce, 2018).

The central regulatory oversight role of OIRA that began during the Carter and Reagan presidencies has continued to grow right up to the present.

9 – Conclusion

This article has presented the various phases of U.S. government regulatory and deregulatory policies from the beginning of the Progressive Era through the Reagan presidency [Figure 1].




Fig. 1 – Waves of Regulation and Deregulation

(Source: Richard Vietor, *Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America* (1996)).

Since the government’s role in regulating economic and social life began during the Progressive Era, the scope and nature of regulations has continued to develop, although not in a linear fashion. The main regulatory and deregulatory phases reflect in part the economic and business environment: rapid industrialization, urbanization, and the formation of large business conglomerates in the late 19th century; the Great Depression in the 1930s; and the oil price shock,

trade deficits, and stagflation during the 1970s. Government regulatory policies were also influenced by the anti-bureaucratic, anti-government sentiment that emerged in the 1970s, the deregulatory sentiment among influential economic scholars, the consumerist and environmental protectionist movements that gained strength in the '70s, even the Counterculture movement in society throughout the 1960s. The article also examined the issue of ultimate legislative authority for regulatory policy, discussing the shift in the balance of such authority from Congress to the Executive branch on the basis of Supreme Court rulings.

Selective historical narrative is by nature limited by its focus on pivotal moments of the topic under discussion. Future research could fill in some of the gaps by focusing on lesser-known episodes or offering alternative perspectives. In addition, given the "cut-off" date chosen for this paper, future studies could examine the significant developments in the post-Reagan administrations. More specifically, areas of interest might include the ongoing consequences of the landmark decision by the Supreme Court in 2024 striking down the so-called Chevron Doctrine that permitted federal agencies to make reasonable interpretations of ambiguous federal laws; and the first Trump Administration's shift from a focus on the net benefits of regulatory costs, which had been the prevailing benchmark for social regulations, to emphasizing the reduction of regulatory costs, with a view toward a reduction in the issuance of new regulations and the removal of existing ones. Other areas might include, the efficiency and effectiveness of federal agencies, public participation and transparency in regulatory processes, the effects of deregulation on industry performance, innovation and public welfare, and political and interest group influence on regulation.

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